Abstract-Cognitive radio techniques represent an emerging approach for mitigating the spectrum scarcity problem in wireless communications. Cooperative sensing is an effective solution to improve sensing accuracy and robustness in the presence of fading and shadowing that make individual sensing less reliable. However, when an adversary can corrupt some nodes in the network, the effectiveness of cooperative sensing may degrade dramatically. We design the first fully distributed security scheme ReDiSen to counter attacks in cooperative sensing. We apply reputation generated from exchanged sensing results as an aid to restrict the impact of the malicious behaviours. Both theoretical analysis and simulation results indicate that ReDiSen provides an effective countermeasure against security attacks by enabling secondary users to obtain more accurate cooperative sensing results in adversarial environments. ReDiSen does not rely on a central authority, nor a common control channel, and is therefore more applicable in dynamic cognitive radio networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
To resolve the disparity between the escalating demand of wireless radio frequency and spectrum under-utilization by license holders (primary users), the concept of an intelligent wireless communications system -Cognitive Radio Network (CRN) has been envisioned [7] . CRN is an emerging technique that mitigates spectrum scarcity in the prosperous area of wireless communications. A cognitive radio is aware of its environment, and adapts to the new scenarios based on its previous experiences. It is possible for unlicensed users (secondary users) to lease spectrum from primary users while respecting their rights.
Spectrum sensing involves the detection of the presence of a transmitted signal of interest, and is crucial for CRN performance. In the sensing process, the cognitive radio users shall not cause harmful interference to the primary users [7] . However, it is a challenge for a cognitive radio to carry out reliable spectrum sensing. Signals suffer from shadow fading and multipath fading. It is also possible for a secondary user to falsely detect a primary user because of noise or interference. These problems can be addressed by requiring multiple secondary users to cooperate with each other in spectrum sensing [14] . Each secondary user acts as a sensing terminal that This work was supported in part by AITF (Alberta Innovates Technology Futures).
conducts local spectrum sensing. In the centralized cooperative sensing process, individual nodes send their local sensing data to a central authority (fusion center), where the data is processed to make a final sensing decision. Cooperative sensing leads to more accurate decisions, consumes less resource at individual nodes, improves the throughput, and overcomes performance degradation due to fading and shadowing [7] .
In an adversarial network environment, an adversary may compromise and control a subset of nodes to attack the cooperative sensing protocol, e.g., by reporting false sensing results that aim to affect the final group decision. Such attacks are known as Spectrum Sensing Data Falsification (SSDF) attacks. Previous studies have shown that the performance of cooperative sensing can degrade significantly due to the falsified reports from malicious nodes [4] .
Existing research on SSDF attacks often assume the existence of a fusion center that collects local measurements and makes the final decision of whether primary users are present or absent [2] , [6] , [8] - [12] . They also assume that a common control channel for information exchange in the protocol. The requirement of a fusion centers and a common control channel leads to its own problems: (1) The centralized schemes usually incur heavy communication overhead between the fusion center and other cognitive radios. The reporting channels between the fusion center and other secondary users may suffer from fading, thus the results become less reliable. (2) Malicious nodes can aim to compromise the fusion center, and hence paralyze the entire system. This single point of failure poses a serious security threat. (3) The dependence on a common control channel makes the protocol vulnerable to jamming attacks. The adversary may launch a Denial-ofService (DoS) attack by flooding the control channel. This is more energy efficient for the adversary compared to jamming all communication channels. (4) All secondary users need to establish connections with the fusion center. While nodes are moving, this behaviour requires an extensive usage of network protocols. (5) Another downside is the leak of private information in some of such security schemes [2] , [6] , [8] , while it is often desirable to protect location privacy in CRNs.
The fusion center and common control channel are essential components to implement the existing secure cooperative sensing solutions, which do not allow a straightforward extension to a distributed solution. While there exist work in the literature that discusses security issues in distributed cooperative sensing, some centralized mechanisms, e.g., root nodes, are still required [5] . In this work, we propose ReDiSen, a Reputation-based Distributed Sensing scheme that is the first fully distributed cooperative spectrum sensing scheme with security assurance against malicious behaviour of a subset of nodes. Our contributions are summarized below.
(1) ReDiSen is a fully distributed and scalable scheme where nodes only exchange information with neighbors. Each node makes its decision based on its local measurement and the values exchanged with its neighbours. Through iterative value updates, honest nodes eventually arrive at a converged value as the cooperative sensing result. The removal of the fusion center and the common control channel reduces communication overhead. Nodes can dynamically move to anywhere at anytime. The adversary cannot benefit from corrupting a small fraction of nodes or jamming the common control channel.
(2) ReDiSen uses reputation to weight received values from neighbors according to their trustworthiness. With the removal of the fusion center and the common control channel, the reputation system provides a mechanism to reduce the effect of malicious nodes, and to help secondary users correctly identify the state of the primary user. Both theoretical analysis and simulation results indicate that ReDiSen can improve the robustness against falsified reports from malicious neighbours.
(3) ReDiSen protects the location privacy of secondary users. Nodes do not need to report their geographic location, which is required by schemes based on spatial correlation [2] , [6] , [8] . A secondary user reliably exchanges information with neighbors within its communication range. The neighbours of a node however change as nodes' locations change. ReDiSen is applicable to dynamic yet adversarial CRN environments.
In the rest of the paper, Sec. II and Sec. III introduce the related work, network model and attack model, respectively. Sec. IV presents the ReDiSen scheme. Sec. V is simulation studies results. Sec. VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Centralized schemes can use location as an additional factor for identifying malicious nodes. The intuition is that cognitive radios which are spatially close should have similar measurements. An outlier, i.e., a secondary user that reports significantly different sensing results from its neighbouring nodes, is deemed as malicious or malfunctioning, and its sensing results will be discarded [2] , [6] , [8] . This however compromises the location privacy of secondary users. There also exist other centralized schemes that study SSDF attacks [9] - [12] . However, all centralized schemes rely on a central authority and require a common control channel.
Li et al. proposed to remove the fusion center by having all cognitive radios update their local measurements with neighboring nodes iteratively to arrive at consensus [3] . A secondary user needs to communicate only with its neighbors. Each secondary user conducts energy detection to obtain a local measurement of the primary user's signal. These measurements are then exchanged with neighbors. A secondary user updates its value based on its own value and the those received from all its neighbors. The updated values are then exchanged. This iterative process continues until a consensus is reached asymptotically for all nodes [13] . The scheme focuses primarily on how to arrive at a consensus without considering possibly falsified local measurements. Yan et al. discuss a number of attacks in the distributed cooperative sensing process [5] . They propose a security scheme that is still not fully distributed, as it contains a hash-based computation verification implemented by a centralized root node.
III. NETWORK MODEL AND ATTACK MODEL
We assume that the primary users form a network of nodes that communicate on a predetermined spectrum with high transmission power. The primary users are located far away from the secondary users, and are abstracted as a single virtual node. Each secondary user utilizes an omnidirectional antenna to communicate with other secondary users. A secondary user i has m i neighbors that report incorrect values (including attacking malicious neighbors and honest nodes that sense incorrectly due to severe fading or system failure), and n i neighbors that report correct values (including honest nodes that sense correctly and non-attacking malicious nodes), each equipped with a cognitive radio. They are located within the transmission range of primary users, and can individually sense the environment to detect the existence of primary users. The network formed by the secondary users is modeled as an undirected graph G = (V, E). The set of secondary users are the nodes V, and the set of edges E ⊂ V × V. A node j is a neighbor of a node i if (i, j) ∈ E, where i = j. The neighbors of a node i is denoted by {j|(i, j) ∈ E} ⊂ V.
An adversary compromises a subset of nodes and modifies their behaviour according to his choice. An honest node has no a priori information on which of its neighbors are malicious. There are two kinds of SSDF attacks aiming to compromise the cooperative sensing process [6] :
(1) Exploitation Attack (EA): The adversary is selfish and aims at using the primary spectrum exclusively. The malicious nodes strategically report higher sensed energy to fabricate the presence of a primary user who is not transmitting.
(2) Vandalism Attack (VA) : The malicious nodes report lower sensed energy to fabricate the absence of a primary user who is in fact transmitting. The goal of the adversary is to incur interference between the primary user and legitimate secondary users.
A malicious node can identify and communicate with other malicious nodes in each attack. We assume malicious nodes will all follow the same behaviour summarized by the following attack strategies:
(1) Always Attack: The malicious nodes attack in all sensing sessions. They always report lower values while the primary user is transmitting, higher values while the primary user is not transmitting.
(2) Random Attack: The malicious nodes may not participate in the sensing process. They just report random values within a rational range to other honest neighbors, no matter whether the primary user is transmitting or not.
(3) Intermittent Attack: The malicious nodes attack in some selected sessions. They report falsified sensed values to the honest neighbors in attacking sessions, and truthful sensed values in non-attacking sessions. We define the attack intensity as the percentage of sessions when falsified values are reported.
IV. THE DESIGN OF ReDiSen
We use a reputation system to weight the information received by a node from its neighbor, with higher weights for honest neighbors that are trusted, and lower weights for neighbors that are less trusted. Reputation systems have been previously used to cope with malicious behaviours [1] . In ReDiSen, nodes monitor behaviours of their neighbors and use this information to assign reputation values to them.
A. Using Reputation to Update Values
Each secondary user obtains a local measurement in a time interval T . After a sensing session, a series of value update sessions are executed by the secondary users. Let V t i,j be the value that a transmitter i sends to a receiver j during the update session t. Here V t j is the value of receiver j during the session t. All secondary users exchange their local measurements of the primary user energy with their neighbors, and update their own values based on the received values. For the honest nodes, assuming their measurements are correct, the initial values are the sensed values of the primary user energy. The malicious nodes can report arbitrary values aiming to achieve their malicious goals.
After the first value exchange, an honest node calculates the reputation of neighbors based on the values received and its own value. The calculation of reputation can use different methods. We use R j,i to denote the reputation value of the transmitter i generated by the receiver j. Then, all secondary users update their values and exchange their updated values with their neighbors as described in Algorithm 1. Here λ is a discount factor [3] . while The converged value is not obtained do Update value as
end while 9: end while
B. Reputation Requirement
We explore general reputation requirements that are needed if ReDiSen produces better results than the results by a reputation-less scheme. The reputation system for ReDiSen is sound if it outputs a higher value than the reputation-less scheme while the primary user is transmitting, and a lower value otherwise, assuming a subset of nodes report falsified values.
The value update scheme in the reputation-less scheme from the literature [3] can be described as:
with initial valueV 0 j =V j [3] . For an honest node j, we denote the reputation of a neighbor i that reports a correct value with R i N , and the reputation of a node i that reports an incorrect value with R i M . Hereby, the two value update schemes can be formulated as
The honest node j may sense correctly or incorrectly in a sensing session. However, it does not know whether its sensed value is correct or not.
If j senses correctly, V 
While the primary user is transmitting, for a neighbor i that reports a correct value, we have V
This indicates that ReDiSen can help j obtain a higher value. While the primary user is not transmitting, for a neighbor i that reports a correct value, we have V , the value from the system without reputation, is higher when the primary user is transmitting, and lower when the primary user is not transmitting.
C. Generating Reputation
Reputation values in ReDiSen are generated once for each sensing session as follows:
Vi,j mj +nj +1
is the average value of all the nodes in the neighborhood. We observe that 0 ≤ R j,i ≤ 2.
The average difference from the average value is given by
. As long as there are more neighbors that report correct values, the distance between the value of a node that senses correctly with the average value shall be smaller than the average distance to the average value, and vice versa.
For a neighbor that reports incorrect values, the distance to the average value is larger than the average distance from the average value.
For a neighbor that reports correct values, the distance to the average value is smaller than the average distance from the average value.
These two cases can justify that the proposed reputationgenerating method in (3) can help honest nodes assign R i M < 1 for neighbors that report incorrect values, R i N > 1 for neighbors that report correct values. This result leads to Corollary 1: Corollary 1. The reputation generated using equation (3) can help honest nodes obtain better cooperative sensing results than the reputation-less scheme, assuming that the majority of neighbors are either correctly sensing honest nodes or nonattacking malicious nodes.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

A. Simulation Objective and Outline
A secondary user is able to decide whether a signal from a primary user is present or not within a certain time and spectrum band. Energy detection is the most widely adopted sensing scheme due to its simplicity, small energy consumption, and short sensing time. The sensed value P i of each secondary user i is the received power of the primary user, which can be expressed by the signal propagation model as
, where P 0 is the transmit power of the primary user, α is the path-loss exponent, d 0 is the reference distance. d i denotes the distance from the secondary user i to the primary user network that is far away from the secondary users. S i represents the power loss effect due to shadowing fading, modeled as a random variable with S i ∼ N (0, σ 2 ). M i represents the multi-path fading effect [5] . In our simulations, P 0 is 80dBm, which is the typical transmission power of a FM radio station. The transmission power is attenuated while arrived at secondary users. The standard variance for fading and shadowing σ is 3dBm. We consider M i as negligible and the reference distance d 0 as 1m. If the primary user is not transmitting, the secondary users can sense only the thermal noise floor −111dBm.
Secondary users are deployed in a 1km × 1km area, and each has the same capacity to communicate with others in the proximity. The parameter λ is 0.995. The primary user is located at 5km away from the center of the secondary user network. While the primary user is transmitting, honest nodes report their sensed values and malicious nodes report the noise floor to their neighbors. While the primary user is not transmitting, honest nodes report the noise floor and malicious nodes report the transit power of the primary user in the Always Attack strategy and attacking sessions of the Intermittent Attack strategy. The final outputs are the updated values in the two equations (1) and (2) with the reputation generated as the equation (3) While the primary user is transmitting, the honest nodes obtain higher updated values (approximately 8dBm higher) than the reputation-less scheme. While the primary user is not transmitting, the honest nodes obtain lower updated values (approximately 37dBm lower) than the reputation-less scheme. Since the honest nodes all start from the same noise floor, so their value update processes are close to each other, which makes the lines almost overlap. Both scenarios indicate that ReDiSen can obtain better cooperative sensing results compared to the reputation-less scheme.
2) Attack Strategies: The malicious nodes can attack in all sensing sessions by reporting falsified values. They can also implement the Random Attack strategy or the Intermittent Attack strategy strategies. For the Intermittent Attack strategy, we simulate the scenario where the malicious nodes attack with a 67% intensity. Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 with 67% intensity. As long as the adversary corrupts less than 75% of the whole CRN, ReDiSen can obtain: (a) higher average values than the reputation-less scheme while the primary user is transmitting; (b) lower average values than the reputation-less scheme while the primary user is not transmitting. Fig. 2 illustrates the differences between ReDiSen and the reputation-less scheme in the Random Attack strategy. A malicious node randomly reports between −111dBm to 80dBm. The simulation results indicate that: no matter whether the primary user is transmitting or not, ReDiSen is better than the reputation-less scheme by updating the values of the honest nodes closer to the truthful state of the primary user even there are 68% malicious nodes. Fig. 3 illustrates the similar effects in the Intermittent Attack strategy with 67% attack intensity, which can tolerate up to 75% malicious nodes. Fig. 2 and Fig.  3 together justify that ReDiSen can obtain better cooperative sensing results in different attack strategies.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We studied SSDF attacks in CRNs, and proposed the first fully distributed security scheme ReDiSen to countermeasure SSDF attacks in cooperative sensing. Using well designed reputation systems and using it in the value update algorithm, ReDiSen can effectively improve the cooperative sensing performance in dynamic yet adversarial environments, and despite removing the fusion center and the common control channel. A future direction is to extend the analysis of reputation to multiple sensing sessions, and to design a solution that can help nodes obtain better cooperative sensing results over long runs of the system.
